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Since the Mexican Microfinance Institution (MFI) Compartamos went public in 2007 – 
whereby promoting NGOs and private investors earned  about USD 425 million – leading 
journals and magazines have repeatedly run rather sceptical articles about microfinance.i They 
are mostly inspired by antagonists of MFIs growing into market driven enterprises. This 
antagonism has been blended with contemplation about assumed “subprime issues” of 
microfinance. However, the sector showed a steady performance, different from most other 
segments of the financial sector. The unholy blend of these two lines of thought risks to create 
an unwarranted image of microfinance. As Gonzales-Vega (2009) put it: “[T]he larger 
numbers of poor household-firms have been reached by organizations that care about 
sustainability imply a substantially greater social welfare impact than the effects associated 
with weak, transitory, non-sustainable efforts of organizations with limited breadth of 
outreach. Thus, sustainability has done more for achieving social goals than any other effort 
in this area. […] The number of those among the poor still without access to finance are so 
huge, that one should be very worried about experts who preach against growth and 
sustainability." 
 
Indeed, the vast majority of microfinance clients around the world is reached by 300 or so 
large MFIs. Large MFIs offer a wider choice of microfinance products at lower cost, and thus 
lower interest rates and fees (annex 1). They serve a larger proportion of women than smaller 
MFIs. They pay their staff better and offer them better prospects of a professional career (see 
Schmidt 2010, in this volume).  
 
Large MFIs are able to do so because economies of scale diffuse fixed costs, and thus allow 
investment in robust, IT-driven back offices, which again drives standardising of processes 
and thus realises further economies of scale.  
 
Large MFIs are able to do so because professional acumen and convincing business models – 
largely replica of market leaders’ models, particularly Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank – attract 
commercial capital, i. e. private equity and commercial credit. This fuels steady growth of the 
organization to reach ever more poor household-firms (widening) and to offer them a wider 
choice of microfinance products (deepening). 
 
Exemplary, for a sample of 223 Indian MFIs, it is found that large MFIs charge less per client 
(interest plus other charges) than medium MFIs and access funding at lower cost than medium 
and small MFIs. They channel more funding from banks – i. e. MFI-borrowing from banks – 
to their average client than the average client of small and medium MFIs. For large MFIs, the 
financial cost per client – i. e. the rate at which the average client accesses bank-funding – 
equals 6.5%, as compared to 8.9% for medium MFIs and 11.5% for small MFIs. Reason 
being that large MFIs operate more efficiently, mainly for economies of scale, and borrow at 
up to 5%-points more favorable rates than small and medium MFIs.ii 
 
There is no evidence of mission drift, as far as the indicators “female clients”, “loan size” or 
“staff pay” are concerned. It is true, though, that “till very recently, there was little rigorous 
evidence on either side — is microcredit transformative or ruinous? However this is changing 
now, thanks to the courage and vision of a few leading MFIs  […] at one level the results are 
remarkably similar. The effect on businesses is not dramatic but some clearly benefit. […] to 
actually blame microcredit for not promoting the immunization of children is no different 
from blaming immunization campaigns for not generating new businesses.” 
(Banerjee/Duflo/Karlan, 2009).  
 
Leading practitioners have, with different nuances, come to argue that it takes about 8-10 
years for microfinance clients to move to considerably improved levels of wellbeing. Over 
this period, clients are faced with socio-economic choices – health care, settling old debts, 
schooling and/or marrying off children, improving housing, participating in issues of the 
community, acquiring skills and establishing household-firms – each of which must be 
complemented by specific microfinance products (see exemplary Sa-Dhan 2009).  
 
This points to the dire need of innovation of a much larger range of microfinance products, 
much beyond “one-size-fits-all”, “meant-to-be-for-business” loans. MFIs have not done 
enough to diversify their credit products, and they have not been enabled enough by 
governments and regulators to offer savings, money-transfers and insurance products, 
including access to equity-based products. However, large MFIs have done more than others 
in these areas.  
 
Sure, large MFIs will always only reach a certain segment of the unbanked and poor, which 
may not be “the poorest”. Through the equity and commercial credit that large MFIs, the 
segment served benefits indirectly from the opportunities of capital markets. As more MFIs 
will be listed at the stock market, they may consider flowing some “micro-equity” directly 
into the portfolios of their clients.  
 
If this admittedly still thin access to the capital markets was capped, it would be a gross 
disservice to the huge number of unbanked households. To avoid such, it is the responsibility 
of MFIs to avoid undue risk of growing wide without growing deep; as it is the responsibility 
of experts (and/or jornalists) to avoid undue risk of painting an image of microfinance that is 
not validated by facts.  
 
Annex 1:  
a) Mean of selected characteristics for large and small MFIs1 
Indicator Large MFIs Total Sample Small MFIs 
Number of MFIs 273 1,084 553 
Number of active borrowers 248,232 69,277 3,194 
Total Assets (US-$) 150.9m 47.6m 6m 
Gross Loan Portfolio (US-$) 118.3m 34.9m 3.5m 
Number of depositors 250,112 72,133 7,552 
Voluntary deposits (US-$) 76.1m 21.9m 2m 
b) Mean of selected performance indicators for large and small MFIs1 
Indicator Large MFIs Total Sample Small MFIs 
Portfolio at Risk, >30days (%) 4.4 5.7 6.5 
Cost per borrower (US-$) 148 267 389 
Yield on Gross Loan Portfolio (%)2 24.8 29.1 27.4 
Number of staff 1,280 391 47 
Average Salary/GNI per capita3 6.4 5.9 5.0 
Female borrowers4 69.8 61.4 55.8 
Loan over GNI5 95.5 81.4 59.3 
1  Large MFIs: > 30,000 active borrowers; small MFIs: < 10,000 active borrowers. 
2  Financial Revenue (interest and fees) from the loan portfolio, divided by gross loan portfolio, corrected   
    for inflation.  
3  Multiplying factor; i. e. how many times of Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of the respective country represents 
average salary of MFI-staff. 
4  Women as % of all active borrowers.  
5  %, calculated by dividing Average Loan Balance per Borrower through GNI per capita. 
Source: MixMarket (2009) 
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i
 In 2008, The New Yorker discussed “What Microloans Miss” (by J. Surowiecki, 17th March). The New York 
Times documented that “Microfinance’s Success Sets Off a Debate in Mexico” (by E. Malkin, 5th April), which 
was also reflected in The Economist “Doing Good by Doing Very Nicely Indeed“ (28th June). The Financial 
Times reviewed “The Battle for the Soul of Microfinance” (by T. Harford, 6th Dec.). In 2009, the Economist 
noted cautious findings of the latest random-trial findings as “A partial marvel” (16th July). The Wall Street 
Journal reported “A Global Surge in Tiny Loans Spurs Credit Bubble in a Slum” (by K. Gokhake, Aug.), which 
caused a heated debate, among other documented by The Economist as “Froth at the Bottom of the Pyramid” 
(25th Aug.). 
ii
 Analysis based on portfolio yield, financial cost and volumes that MFIs borrowed from commercial banks; in 
relation to the number of clients served by respective MFI peer group. Peer groups based on portfolio volume: 
<1.25m US$ = small; >1.25m<12.5m US$ = medium; >12.5m US$ = large (Exchange Rate of 31st March 2008, 
US-$:INR 39.9:1). Data source: Sa-Dhan Quick Survey 2008; for details on the dataset, see Sa-Dhan’s The 
Bharat Microfinance Report – Quick Data 2008, New Delhi.  
